Intersection theory and the Alesker product

Alesker has introduced the space $\mathcal V^\infty(M)$ of {\it smooth valuations} on a smooth manifold $M$, and shown that it admits a natural commutative multiplication. Although Alesker's original construction is highly technical, from a moral perspective this product is simply an artifact of the operation of intersection of two sets. Subsequently Alesker and Bernig gave an expression for the product in terms of differential forms. We show how the Alesker-Bernig formula arises naturally from the intersection interpretation, and apply this insight to give a new formula for the product of a general valuation with a valuation that is expressed in terms of intersections with a sufficiently rich family of smooth polyhedra.Comment: further revisons, now 23 page

Collection Development of HIV/AIDS Information Resources in American Libraries

HIV/AIDS remains an incurable epidemic in the United States that disproportionately affects men who have sex with men (MSM) and African Americans. Library and information science (LIS) professionals can play a vital role in keeping these higher risk groups informed about preventing HIV/AIDS and living with the disease, through a variety of current information resources that addresses their specific questions. This paper reviews collection development policies proposed by LIS professionals and library agencies since the late 1980s, and evaluates how such policies took higher-risk user groups into consideration. The findings of this paper are that collection development policies have become more attentive to higher-risk user groups but that LIS research trends are now beginning to focus more on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries, which is to the detriment of Americans who still need up-to-date materials on the disease

Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules

Considering the dynamics of commitment highlights, some neglected features of time inconsistency problems. We modify the standard rules-versus-discretion question in three ways: (1) A government that does not commit today retains the option to do so tomorrow, (2) the government's commitment capability is restricted to a class of simple rules, and (3) the government's ability to make irrevocable commitments is restricted. Three results stand out. First, the option to wait makes the incumbent regime (rules or discretion) relatively more attractive. Second, the option to wait means that increased uncertainly makes the incumbent regime more attractive. Third, because the commitment decision takes place in 'real time,' policy choice displays hysteresis.Monetary policy

Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules

An examination of the dynamics of commitment, showing that because the decision regarding rules versus discretion occurs in real time, opting for discretion is often the better choice, since it leaves open the possibility of adopting rules later on.Monetary policy